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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and
Gregory R. Miller**
Of the domestic relations appellate cases decided during the survey
period, eighteen are digested here.' As has been the recent trend, the
Legislature and the appellate courts have continued to focus primarily
on issues surrounding children.
I. DIVORCE
The appellate courts considered the admissibility of evidence
frequently gathered in domestic relations cases. In Barlow v. Barlow,2
the husband wanted to admit into evidence a tape recording of his wife's
cordless telephone conversation with an alleged paramour. A neighbor
recorded the conversation without the knowledge of either party to the
telephone conversation. The trial court refused to suppress the
recording.' The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding Georgia's antiwiretapping statute4 applies to telephone calls made on cordless
telephones.5 The court found users of cordless telephones have an
expectation of privacy similar to users of land lines and cellular
telephones, which have been expressly included within the anti-

* Partner in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (L.L.B., 1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D., 1994). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. This survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 1999 to May 31, 2000.
2. 272 Ga. 102, 526 S.E.2d 857 (2000).
3. Id. at 102, 526 S.E.2d at 858.
4. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(4) (Supp. 2000).
5. 272 Ga. at 104, 526 S.E.2d at 859.
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wiretapping statute.6 The decision does not address whether the
neighbor was acting as the husband's agent when the recording was
made or whether the agency issue would make any difference in the
admissibility of the recording.
In In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings,7 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held a private investigator hired to gather evidence for the
husband in a divorce case could testify before a grand jury considering
criminal charges against the husband.8 The husband's divorce lawyer
hired the investigator to investigate an alleged affair by the wife. The
alleged paramour was later found murdered. When the victim's family
offered a reward, the investigator came forward with evidence amassed
during the investigation. The trial court denied the husband's assertion
that his conversations with the investigator were subject to the attorneyclient privilege.9 The appellate court held the conversations occurred
after the investigation was concluded and, therefore, were not privileged.' ° Even if privilege attached, the court held the conversations
were conducted in furtherance of a crime and therefore admissible under
the crime-fraud exception."
In addition to the evidence questions, the supreme court looked at
divorce procedure. In Brown v. Brown, 2 the wife named her mother-inlaw as a codefendant, alleging she held title to real property that
actually belonged to the divorcing spouses. When the mother-in-law did
not file an answer, the wife successfully moved for a default judgment." The supreme court held the provisions of Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 19-5-8, which prohibits default
judgments from being granted in divorce, alimony or custody actions,
apply to third-party defendants."

6. Id. When the court of appeals held in Salmon v. State, 206 Ga. App. 469, 470-71,
426 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1992), that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 did not apply to cellular telephone
conversations, the Legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66.1 expressly to include
protections for cellular calls. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66.1 (1999).
7. 244 Ga. App. 380, 535 S.E.2d 340 (2000).
8. Id. at 380, 535 S.E.2d at 340.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 383, 535 S.E.2d at 343.
11. Id. at 382, 535 S.E.2d at 342 (citing In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175
Ga. App. 349, 352, 333 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1985)).
12. 271 Ga. 887, 525 S.E.2d 359 (2000).
13. Id. at 887, 525 S.E.2d at 359.
14. Id. at 888, 525 S.E.2d at 360.
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CHILD CUSTODY

Issues surrounding children, particularly custody, were prevalent in
both the Legislature and appellate courts. Despite last year's veto of
similar legislation, Governor Roy Barnes signed legislation that requires
trial courts to consider the custodial wishes of children over the age of
eleven. 5 The trial courts are not bound by the child's decision and
must apply the best-interest-of-the-child standard. The election by a
child over the age of eleven, but under
the age of fourteen, shall not be
16
grounds for a modification action.
During this survey period, the appellate courts again considered venue
and jurisdiction. In Roach v. Kapur,7 the court of appeals held it was
error for the trial court to allow the father to file a counterclaim for
custody modification when the mother had filed an action to modify the
support provisions of the parties' divorce decree." The mother filed her
action in the county of her residence. Based on the father's motion, the
case was transferred to the county of his residence. When the father
filed his counterclaim for custody, the mother then moved to transfer
venue. The mother appealed when the trial court denied her motion.' 9
The court of appeals, citing O.C.G.A. section 19-9-23, held the counterclaim was improper because it was not a separate action nor was it filed
in the county of the custodial parent's residence. 2' A different panel
reached a similar decision in Wilson v. Baldwin.2'
Also, a trial court may not arbitrarily decline to exercise jurisdiction
22
over child custody. In Patterson v. Patterson,
the parties presented
conflicting evidence as to whether Georgia should exercise jurisdiction
over the custody case. Without making any determinations of fact, the
trial court decided a trial in Georgia "may not be in the best interest of
everybody." 23 For a trial court to decline jurisdiction based on an
inconvenient forum rationale, the trial court must find that the alternate
forum would be in the child's best interest and that the alternate forum

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(3)(B) (Supp. 2000).
Id.
240 Ga. App. 558, 524 S.E.2d 246 (1999).
Id. at 559, 524 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Id. at 558, 524 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 559, 524 S.E.2d at 246-47.
239 Ga. App. 327, 519 S.E.2d 251 (1999).
271 Ga. 306, 519 S.E.2d 438 (1999).
Id. at 308, 519 S.E.2d at 440.
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would accept jurisdiction.24 Because the trial court failed to make the
necessary inquiries, it was error to decline jurisdiction.2"
Relocation has continued to be an issue in custody modification
actions. In Ofchus v. Isom,26 the court of appeals held the trial court
abused its discretion in modifying custody.2" Based on the mother's
decision to relocate with her new husband to Virginia, the trial court
modified custody in favor of the father.2' The court of appeals gave no
credence to the trial court's findings that the move would be detrimental
to the child based on the child's being removed from regular visits with
the father and other relatives. 9 Because the mother was the primary
custodial parent under the divorce decree, she had a prima facie right to
continue as the custodial parent.3" To overcome that right, the father
needed to show that the mother was no longer able or suited to be the
custodial parent, that conditions had changed negatively affecting the
child's home life, or that the child's welfare would be promoted by the
change of custody.3 '
In Mahan v. McCrae,"2 the court of appeals again held the trial court
improperly changed custody based on the custodial parent's decision to
move out of state.33 The trial court ruled the modification was warranted not only because of the move, but also because the mother had
blocked the father's attempts to visit with the children beyond what was
provided for in the parties' judgment.3 4 The appellate court noted past
decisions approving a custody change due to the custodial parent's
interference with the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. 5 The
court then found no legal support for modifying custody because the
custodial parent did not give the noncustodial parent rights beyond what
was contained in the visitation order."6
Three judges dissented,"

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 239 Ga. App. 738, 521 S.E.2d 871 (1999).
27. Id. at 740, 521 S.E.2d at 873.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 739-40, 521 S.E.2d at 873.
32. 241 Ga. App. 109, 522 S.E.2d 772 (1999).
33. Id. at 110, 522 S.E.2d at 774.
34. Id. at 111, 522 S.E.2d at 774.
35. Id. (citing Moore v. Wiggins, 230 Ga. 51, 55, 195 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1973); Bull v.
Bull, 243 Ga. 72, 72, 252 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1979); and Arp v. Hammonds, 200 Ga. App. 715,
717-18, 409 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1991)).
36. Id. at 110, 522 S.E.2d at 774.
37. The majority in the 4-3 decision was comprised of Chief Judge Johnson and Judges
Pope, Eldridge and Barnes. The dissent, authored by Judge Smith, was joined by Judges
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finding evidence existed that supported the trial court's determination
that the mother's actions had emotionally harmed the children.3"
Nonparents seeking custody continues to capture the interest of both
the appellate courts and the Legislature. Effective July 1, 2000, the
Legislature expanded the list of relatives who may seek custody of a
child under the best-interest-of-the-child standard to include greatgrandparents.3" In In re Stroh,4 the court of appeals held that while
in
Georgia law prohibits nonresidents from adopting a child residing
42
Georgia,41 nonresidents cannot be prohibited from seeking custody.
In Stills v.Johnson,43 the maternal and paternal grandmothers were
opposing each other for custody of their grandchild. After the mother
died of cancer, the father, who was incarcerated, transferred custody to
the paternal grandmother. The trial court held the custody transfer
valid and required the maternal grandmother to show the paternal
grandmother to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence.44 The
supreme court held that the trial court applied the incorrect standard.45
In custody disputes between relatives, the parties need only show what
is in the child's best interest. 46 The fact that the father voluntarily
transferred custody to one relative does not create a heightened
standard.47
In Perrin v.Stansell,4" the court of appeals held a relative seeking
visitation privileges with a minor child, who is in the temporary custody
of another relative rather than either parent, need only show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be in the child's
best interest.49 Although the grandparents' visitation statute50 requires a relative to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
potential harm due to the absence of visitation outweighs the parents'
right to raise the child, the statute does not apply to nonparent
custodians.5 ' The custodian does "not stand in the shoes of the parent,"

Blackburn and Ellington. Id. at 113, 522 S.E.2d at 775.
38. Id. at 114, 522 S.E.2d at 776.
39. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (Supp. 2000).
40. 240 Ga. App. 835, 523 S.E.2d 887 (1999).
41. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3(a)(3) (1999).
42. 240 Ga. App. at 840, 523 S.E.2d at 891.
43. No. S00A6118, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 542 (July 10, 2000).
44. Id. at *2.
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 243 Ga. App. 475, 533 S.E.2d 458 (2000).
49. Id. at 478, 533 S.E.2d at 461.
50. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (1999).
51. 243 Ga. App. at 477, 533 S.E.2d at 461.
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and therefore, does not have the constitutional protections contemplated
by O.C.G.A. section 19-7-3.52
III.

LEGITIMATION

The courts have addressed the issues affecting the legitimacy of
children. In Hall v. Coleman,5" the court of appeals held the trial court
erred in not declaring the child to be the father's legitimate child. 4
The child's parents married upon learning of the pregnancy; however,
the marriage was later determined to be void because the child's mother
had never obtained a divorce from her prior husband. After the parents
separated, the mother consented to allowing a couple to adopt the child.
The trial court denied the father's motion to legitimate the child. 5 The
appellate court ruled the motion to legitimate was unnecessary because
the child was legitimate by virtue of the parents' marriage.56 The fact
the marriage5 7 was later deemed invalid did not cause the child to become
illegitimate.

In In re Estate of Garrett,5" the court of appeals held the biological
father had no right to inherit from his son.59 Absent a court order
legitimating the child, a court finding of paternity, genetic test results,
a sworn statement from the father acknowledging the parent-child
relationship, or the father's signing of the birth certificate, the father
cannot seek to inherit from the child.6 ° Once the child has died, it is
too late for the father to take any action 'towards legitimating the
child.6 '
IV.

CHILD SUPPORT

The appellate courts took a hard look at the procedures parties must
follow when seeking to obtain or enforce an award of child support. In
Hackbart v. Hackbart,6' the supreme court reversed the trial court's
divorce decree because the order included a child support provision even
though the mother did not make a demand for child support in her

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
242 Ga. App. 576, 530 S.E.2d 485 (2000).
Id. at 578, 530 S.E.2d at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
244 Ga. App. 65, 534 S.E.2d 843 (2000).
Id. at 66, 534 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
Id.
272 Ga. 26, 526 S.E.2d 840 (2000).
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pleadings."
"While OCGA § 19-5-10 allows a court presiding over an
undefended divorce case to conduct a hearing and make a determination
on child support, it does not authorize a court to grant relief beyond that
requested in the pleadings."' The court noted the mother's failure to
follow proper procedures did not preclude her from other avenues of
having a child support order put in place.65
In Rose v. Thorpe,66 the mother filed an action to modify child
support because she claimed the father under-reported his income at the
time of the divorce. The trial court agreed with the mother, ordering the
father to make a lump sum payment of $17,500 and increasing the
monthly payments.
The appellate court held the trial court abused
its authority by retroactively modifying the child support award.68 The
court indicated that if the mother had wanted to obtain a retroactive
application, she should have filed a motion to set aside the judgment, not
a motion to modify the child support.69
In Ward v. DHR,7 ° the court of appeals held the Department of
Human Resources ("DHR") should have filed a motion to modify child
support rather than an action to establish support. 71 However, the
court found the error to be harmless because the mother was given
notice and a de novo hearing.7 2 The mother also argued that DHR
failed to meet the standards set forth in O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19
necessary for a modification to be made. 73 However, the court held
those standards only apply in modification actions directly between
parents.74 When DHR is involved, the Department is required to
determine if the payments are consistent with the
child support
76
guidelines78 and make recommendations accordingly.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 27, 526 S.E.2d at 841-42.
Id., 526 S.E.2d at 842.
Id.
240 Ga. App. 834, 525 S.E.2d 381 (1999).
Id. at 834, 525 S.E.2d at 382.
Id.
Id. at 834-35, 525 S.E.2d at 382.
241 Ga. App. 298, 527 S.E.2d 3 (1999).
Id. at 299, 527 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 300, 527 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 299, 527 S.E.2d at 5.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (1999).
241 Ga. App. at 299-300, 527 S.E.2d at 5.
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V. ALIMONY
In an action to modify the alimony provisions of a divorce decree, the
trial court may not prohibit a party from introducing the divorce decree
into evidence. In Cotton v. Cotton," the trial court granted the former
wife's motion to suppress the divorce decree and excluded any testimony,
evidence or argument as to the aggregate amount of alimony that had
been paid.7 8 The court of appeals held the prior judgment was required
to be admitted into evidence and the failure to do so was reversible
error.79 Yet the appellate court also held the trial court was within its
discretion in preventing the parties from referring to the aggregate
amount of alimony that had been paid. 0 That evidence would not be
relevant to the modification action, but it could have a prejudicial effect,
and therefore, the trial court acted properly.8
Finally, the appellate courts tackled the issue of health insurance
coverage in Blair v. Blair.2 As part of alimony, the husband was
ordered to maintain health insurance coverage for the wife comparable
to the plan provided him by his employer. The husband continued to
pay for the conversion policy, but it did not provide comparable coverage.
The wife obtained a better policy, but the husband refused to pay for the
more expensive policy obtained by the wife. When the wife filed a
contempt action, the trial court ordered the husband to pay the higher
premiums plus $13,044.41 in expenses that would have been covered
under the employer's policy but were not covered under the conversion
policy.8 3 The appellate court held the trial court did not go far
enough.8 4
To the extent a party fails to provide required health
insurance for a former spouse, the obligated party becomes a selfinsurer.8" The appellate court reasoned that the husband paid for
approximately 29.5% of the total premiums; therefore, he was liable for
70.5% of the $74,638 in expenses covered by the wife's insurance
policy.8

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

272 Ga. 276, 528 S.E.2d 255 (2000).
Id. at 276, 528 S.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 277, 528 S.E.2d at 256-57.
Id. at 278, 528 S.E.2d at 257.
Id.
272 Ga. 94, 527 S.E.2d 177 (2000).
Id. at 95, 527 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 96, 527 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 96-97, 527 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 97, 527 S.E.2d at 179.

